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1. Introduction 
Models of wage bargaining often assume that unions have an objective function with two 
elements: wages and employment (Farber, 1978; MacDonald and Solow, 1981; Grossman, 
1983; Blair and Crawford, 1984). Hence, they implicitly adopt the conjecture that union 
members or the union leadership have other-regarding or social preferences (Rabin, 1993; 
Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; 
Falk and Fischbacher, 2006) for those non-union members who are non-employed or those 
who would have to fear unemployment in case of rising wages. In contrast, insider-outsider 
models of wage bargaining (Linbeck and Snower, 1989) are based on the premise of 
discrimination between insiders (union members) and outsiders (not members of the union). 
In this paper, we assess the extent of preferences for employment in an abstract 
collective wage bargaining situation with heterogeneous workers. A laboratory experiment 
might allow inferring underlying preferences better than data from the field that may be 
contaminated by factors that are very hard to control for, such as the organization of and 
decision making procedures within a union, inter-temporal aspects of wage setting, 
unobserved incentives, or objectives of union members, and so on. We view our results as 
complementary to findings based on field data of union wage bargaining behavior. We are not 
aware of any other laboratory or field experiment that addresses the question of to what extent 
employment is taken into account in collective wage bargaining. Having said that, it is clear 
that a laboratory setup cannot capture the complexity of real-world wage bargaining. On the 
contrary, it should not in order to maintain as much control as possible over the incentive 
effects present under specified conditions. We discuss the limits of our results in terms of 
external validity in greater detail in the discussion section. 
In our experiment we set up a stylized labor market with five heterogeneously 
productive workers, and we vary the number of union members exogenously. In one 
treatment, all workers are union members that decide on the joint wage level, and in another 
treatment three out of five (the three most productive workers) are union members. We 
choose the three most productive workers to be union members to maximize the potential 
conflict among workers in our setup, without implicating that such a union membership is 
most realistic. Workers face a (fictitious) firm that bases its employment decision 
deterministically on the wage rate, and the employment schedule contingent on the wage is 
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common knowledge. The decision making process within the union is captured by a median 
voting mechanism, i.e. the median wage proposal of the workers who are eligible to vote (five 
or three) determines the actual wage and, consequently, the employment level. In order to 
make wage proposals of all union members fully incentive compatible and not only the 
proposal of the median voter, there is a chance in our experiment that one of the five or three 
individual wage proposal becomes directly implemented. More precisely, with probability q 
the median voting mechanism becomes implemented, and with probability (1-q), the 
individual proposal is relevant. With q = 0 the problem reduces to an individual allocation 
task akin to a dictator game (Kahneman et al., 1986; Forsythe et al., 1994)1 but still with a 
well-defined labor market frame. With q = 1 the median voter’s preference will be 
implemented with certainty, but sincere voting is not the only equilibrium anymore. In the 
experiment we implement between-subject treatments with q = 1, q = 0.8, q = 0.2, q = 0 (and 
the dictator knows her dictator role before taking the decision; denoted EX ANTE), and q = 0 
(with the dictator implementing her decision before she knows to be decisive; denoted EX 
POST). The two dimensions (number of voters and q) span up a 2x5 factorial experimental 
design. 
Our results indicate that proposals in the main treatments with a low level of q are very 
close to the selfish benchmark. Highly productive workers do not take employment of low 
productive workers into account when they make their wage proposals. Interestingly, there is 
no significant difference between the insider-outsider treatment (with three voters) and the 
all-workers treatment (with all five workers voting). 
Several explanations for the low level of social preferences – when compared to results 
from more general allocation games (Charness and Rabin, 2002; Engelmann and Strobel, 
2004) and to results from the dictator game (Kahneman et al., 1986; Forsythe et al., 1994; 
Eckel and Grossman, 1996; List, 2007; Bardsley, 2008) – are conceivable. 
One possible explanation is the framing of our decision making situation as the decision 
making problem of a union. However, most research on social distance (Hoffman et al., 1996; 
Bohnet and Frey, 1999) and social identity (Tajfel et al., 1971; Charness et al., 2007; Chen 
                                                 
1 The standard dictator “game” is a two-person allocation task in which one person (the “dictator”) 
receives a positive endowment and can transfer any amount between zero and the endowment to a powerless 
recipient. 
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and Li, 2009; Hargreaves Heap and Zizzo, 2009; Sutter, 2009) in the realm of other-regarding 
preferences would indicate that our framing should, if anything, discriminate in favor of the 
in-group (union) members, e.g. by amplifying other-regarding behavior towards other union 
members. In other words, the minimal group paradigm could be applicable in our setup when 
union members perceive themselves as part of one group, because the social distance between 
union members would be decreased. As a consequence, union members should tend to take 
other union members’ employment into account in the wage setting, and one would expect a 
treatment difference between the insider-outsider and the all-workers treatments. Even if in-
group favoritism were not to work in the direction of positive discrimination towards in-group 
members, but rather in terms of negative discrimination, we should observe a difference in 
behavior between these two treatments. However, such reasoning is not borne out by the data 
from our experiment. 
A second explanation coming from research on group decision making in economics 
and social psychology is also be plausible in our context. Group membership leads individuals 
to more selfish decisions if they cannot be held accountable2 individually for their choices 
(Bornstein and Yaniv, 1998; Kugler et al., 2007; Luhan et al., 2009; Balafoutas et al., 2014). 
Group members have the possibility to “hide” behind others because they are non-identifiable 
(e.g., Insko et al., 1987, 1988; Güth et al., 1996; Abbink and Herrmann, 2011). The social 
demands or moral costs of the decision problem are therefore reduced (Ellingsen and 
Johannesson, 2008; Zizzo, 2010; Abbink and Herrman, 2011). Whereas the majority of 
research has been conducted with groups in which group members can interact directly 
(through a real-time chat or face-to-face communication), our setup does not allow for a group 
interaction beyond the voting mechanism that determines final wages.3 
The variation in q in our experiment can give us some guidance on to what extent the 
feeling of accountability of single group members might influence other-regarding 
                                                 
2 For accountability research in the context of risky decision making see Pahlke et al. (2011) and Vieider 
(2011). The term “moral wiggle room” has also been used to describe decisions in which one finds an easy 
excuse for a selfish decision (Dana et al., 2007). 
3 This might itself have an effect on behavior, but we are not aware of any study that alters the level of 
interaction within a group systematically (see also Kocher and Sutter, 2007). For surveys, see Charness and 
Sutter (2012) and Kugler et al. (2012). 
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preferences, i.e. the concern for overall employment. In general, a q bounded away from q = 
0.5 should increase other-regarding preferences for decisive voters. In particular q = 0 and q = 
1 should increase responsibility, because in the former case the median voter will be decisive 
with certainty (assuming sincere voting) and in the latter the dictator will be decisive. Hence 
in both cases, it is a single person that determines the wage and the employment level with 
certainty. Our data only partly confirms this hypothesis. Only if q goes down to zero, we 
observe the expected effect of taking other workers into account, interpreted as accountability 
in our setup. It is important to stress the methodological contribution that comes in passing 
with our variation in q. In a between-subject design we gradually transform a voting game 
into an individual allocation task, presumably increasing the perceived accountability of 
participants in the laboratory. This is done without changing the basic setup and instructions 
of the decision making problem at hand. It is important to add that we do not introduce any 
kind of formal accountability vis-à-vis another individual in our experiment. Hence, strictly 
speaking, decision makers are only accountable to themselves, and one might prefer the term 
“guilt” instead of “accountability” in that case. We do not take a stance here but henceforth 
stick to the term “accountability”, henceforth, when describing the effects of one’s degree of 
influence on the final decision.  
Our study provides evidence for the extent to which productive workers take the 
employment decision of firms and, consequently, the outcome of less productive workers into 
account. Our stylized setting abstracts from several important features of collective wage 
bargaining in the real world, but it shows that collective decisions might do a poorer job in 
taking the least productive into account than individual (dictator) decisions. Put differently, 
our results indicate that there is what we label an accountability effect: increasing the level of 
individual accountability in allocation decisions has the potential to increase the importance 
of other-regarding concerns. 
Section 2 introduces the details of our experimental design and provides theoretical 
hypothesis. In Section 3 we present the experimental results, first on an aggregate level, 
focusing on treatment differences, and then on the basis of a regression analysis. Section 4 
discusses our findings and concludes the paper. 
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2. Experimental design and theoretical predictions 
2.1. Experimental design of the main part 
The main part of the experiment introduced groups consisting of five randomly assembled 
participants that we referred to as workers in the experimental instructions (see the online 
appendix for a specimen). Workers are heterogeneous with regard to their productivity; in the 
experiment we told participants that there were different types (type 1 to type 5, with type 1 
being most productive) for which different wage ranges would allow the firm to employ them. 
Type 1 would be employed for every permissible wage, type 2 for a smaller wage range 
starting below the maximum wage, and so on. Details are given in Table 1. 
Depending on the treatment, either all five (all-workers treatment; denomination INS in 
the following) or only the three most productive workers (insider-outsider treatment; 
INSOUT) were eligible to determine the wage level. In the former case there are no outsiders 
on the market, in the latter case there are two outsiders, and our design assigns the roles 
exogenously.4 More specifically, the more productive workers are always insiders in our 
experiment, in order to maximize the potential conflict among workers. The wage level 
determines the number of employed workers (see Table 1). All employed workers earn the 
wage, and unemployed worker earn zero. 
 
(Insert Table 1 about here.) 
 
The voting procedure to determine the wage is as simple as possible: the median wage 
proposal of the eligible workers out of the permissible wage range, ]100,1[w , was 
implemented. As the second treatment variable we vary the probability q with which the 
median proposal out of the proposals of the union members would become implemented 
instead of a randomly selected individual proposal from the set of the union members (with 
probability 1 – q). The variable q is intended to adjust the level of accountability, and it makes 
sure that, with q < 1, not only the proposal of the median proposer is fully incentive-
compatible. The variable q is set at 1, 0.8, 0.2 and 0 in different treatments of our experiment. 
                                                 
4 An assignment according to the performance in a task would most likely reinforce our results regarding 
selfish behavior, because participants would perceive their position as earned rather than just assigned. 
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The uncertainty coming from q is resolved after making a wage proposal in the treatments 
with q = 0.8 and q = 0.2. In the treatments with q = 0, we implement one treatment in which 
participants in the experiment learn only ex post whether one is the “dictator” in determining 
the wage (denoted EX-POST), and one in which the “dictator” knows it already before 
determining the wage (EX-ANTE). The latter treatment further increases accountability. 
Treatments with q = 1 implement the median voter’s preference with certainty. This adds 
additional voting equilibria, but under sincere voting it might also increase feelings of 
accountability. Table 2 summarizes the conditions applied in our experiment, and Figure 1 
gives a graphical overview. The treatment variation is implemented between experimental 
subjects. No experimental participant experienced more than treatment. 
The wage determination game is repeated ten times. Types and groups of workers 
remain constant over these ten periods.5 At the end of each period, the common wage is 
announced and everybody sees whether he or she is employed or not. Workers of type 4 and 
type 5 in the INSOUT treatments also receive this information, but they cannot submit a wage 
proposal. Individual proposals are not revealed, but workers learn whether it was the median 
proposal that was implemented or a randomly chosen proposal of the eligible workers (if 
applicable). In the EX-ANTE treatments, we asked those workers who knew that they were 
not going to determine the actual wage level to provide us with the wage level that they would 
have chosen, had they been selected as the dictator. These choices are not incentivized. 
 
2.2. Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
Following McDonald and Solow (1981), we describe a model of wage bargaining with non-
linear preferences for union members. We assume that there are five workers, each indexed 
by subscript i, i = 1,2,3,4,5. Workers are ranked in terms of their productivity level, Qi, as 
follows: Q1 > Q2 > Q3 > Q4 > Q5. There are no costs associated with effort. A worker is 
employed if Qi ≥ w, the wage offered by the firm. In the first version of our model, only the 
three most productive workers vote. In the second version, all five workers vote. The voting 
procedure is identical to the one outlined in Section 2.1. We consider q = 0.8 here, but the 
extension to other values of q is immediate. In other words, in our theoretical setting the 
                                                 
5 For reasons of comparability to experiments planned in the future, we decided to frame the ten decisions 
as five periods, each consisting of two identical stages, in the experimental instructions. 
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median wage proposal out of the permissible wage range, ]100,1[w , is implemented with an 
eighty percent probability. For the remaining twenty percent of the time, one of the wages 
submitted by workers 1, 2, or 3 in treatment INSOUT or 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 in treatment INS is 
randomly chosen as the relevant wage. 
 
2.2.1. Insider-outsider model: Only workers 1, 2, and 3  vote 
We assume that the three most productive workers form a union and vote for the uniform 
wage that each employed worker receives. Once the wage has been chosen, each worker 
receives the chosen wage. Non-employment occurs if w > Qi. 
Assume that preferences over employment and wages for each union member are given 
by: 
Ui 
wL ,if  w Qi
L ,if  w Qi



    0 
where λ represents the utility weight that each worker puts on the aggregate 
employment level, L. We assume that λ is the same for all workers; allowing for individual 
differences in the parameter is a straightforward extension. 
The productivities (we often refer to them as “outputs”) used in our laboratory 
experiment are Q1 = 100, Q2 = 50, Q3 = 33, Q4 = 25, and Q5 = 20.6 
 
Proposition 1: Fix a value of  0. Then: 
• If 0 ≤ < 1, the unique Nash equilibrium is (w1,w2,w3) = (Q1,Q2,Q3). 
• If =1, there are multiple Nash equilibria. 
• If  >1, the unique Nash equilibrium is (w1,w2,w3) = (Q5,Q5,Q5). 
 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
 
                                                 
6 In order to simplify the analysis we assume that all employment and wages levels in the utility function 
are multiple of 100. Hence, we set Q3 = 100/3 (instead of 33). 
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The proposition  shows that when λ is low (λ < 1), i.e. when workers put a lower weight 
on employment levels than they put on the wage levels, workers vote for the highest possible 
wage that would maximize their earnings. As a result, the employment level is low. When 
λ > 1, workers put more weight on employment levels than they put on their wage levels. As a 
result all workers are willing to accept a wage cut to help other workers get a job. All workers 
then vote for the wage that is compatible with full employment. 
 
2.2.2. All five workers vote 
We now consider the case where all five workers submit a wage proposal. This turns out to be 
a straightforward generalization of the analysis in the previous section. 
 
Proposition 2: For each value of   0, there is a unique Nash equilibrium:  
• If 0 ≤ < 1, the unique Nash equilibrium is (w1,w2,w3,w4,w5) = (Q1,Q2,Q3,Q4,Q5). 
• If = 1, there are multiple Nash equilibria. 
If  > 1, the unique Nash equilibrium is (w1,w2,w3,w4,w5) = ( Q5, Q5, Q5, Q5, Q5). 
 
Proof: See the Appendix 
 
The result extends the result in Proposition 1 to the case where five workers (instead of 
three) vote on the wage level. Again when λ is low (λ < 1), i.e. when workers put a lower 
weight on employment levels than they put on the wage levels, the employment level is low 
as workers vote for a high wage, and vice versa. 
 
2.2.3. Discussion and implications of the theoretical results 
Our results of course depend on the choice of the specific form of nonlinear preferences 
and productivities chosen for the experiment. With different preferences, and the same 
productivities, or the same utility and different productivities, there would be different Nash 
equilibria. However the qualitative conclusions for a high (low) λ would be the same: a high λ 
implies that workers care more about other workers and would be more willing to accept 
wage cuts in order to help workers that are less productive than themselves. 
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The first prediction from the model is that wage proposals are the same when union 
membership is restricted to three workers and when all five workers vote. In both cases, a low 
λ implies that workers vote for the highest feasible wage and low employment, whereas a high 
λ guarantees that workers are willing to accept wage cuts in order to help other workers get a 
job. Naturally, the resulting wages are expected to be different because of the median voter 
scheme. 
The second prediction comes from a simple fact: it is more expensive for more 
productive types to help workers who are less productive. Worker 1 must accept a wage cut of 
50 points in order to help worker 2 get a job, whereas worker 4 must only accept a wage cut 
of 5 points to help worker 5 get a job. Although our model predicts bang-bang solutions with 
either full selfishness or full employment, our behavioral expectation is that more productive 
workers are less likely to go down to the next wage level that increases employment. Our 
theoretical result is implied by the specific functional form of the utility function and the 
assumption of uniform λ across workers, and other assumptions would yield different 
predictions. 
The third prediction is that more pro-social workers, i.e. workers with higher λ in our 
model, perhaps because of altruism or inequality aversion, are more likely to propose lower 
wages. 
Finally, we note that, because votes in our model reveal the worker’s true preferences, it 
would not make a difference to their proposals whether, instead of having the setup 
considered in this model, we had a unilateral determination of the wage by one of the 
workers. It will be handy to refer to this observation as a fourth prediction, though of course 
not one explicitly made within the model itself. The accountability effect referred to in the 
introduction would, of course, imply a direct violation of this fourth prediction. 
 
2.3. Experimental procedure 
The computer-based experiment was conducted at the experimental laboratory MELESSA of 
the University of Munich in 2011 and 2016, using the experimental software z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007) and the organizational software ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). 520 students 
from all disciplines participated in 26 sessions, each with 20 participants. Approximately 61% 
of participants were female. Sessions lasted a bit more than an hour, and the average payoff 
was 15.55 euro, including a show-up fee of 4 euro. 
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Upon arrival, experimental participants were seated in separate cubicles. Each session 
started with instructions for the main part of the experiment (described in detail in Section 
2.1). At this stage it was made clear that there would be additional parts of the experiments, 
but that the instructions for these parts would only be handed out after the completion of the 
current part. It was also stressed to participants that decisions in one part would be completely 
unrelated to those in the other parts. Participants received written instructions (see the online 
appendix), which were read aloud to ensure common knowledge of them. Everybody had the 
opportunity to ask questions in private. 
We implemented a random lottery mechanism (e.g., Starmer and Sugden, 1991), paying 
only one out of the ten periods in the first part of the experiment. Such a payment scheme 
avoids monetary complementarities (e.g., wealth effects) between periods that are supposed 
theoretically to be completely independent. The payoff-relevant period was randomly selected 
at the end of the experiment. The conversion rate for experimental points into euro (1 
experimental point equals 0.25 euro) was clearly stated in the instructions. At the end of each 
period, every worker was informed about the chosen wage level within the group of five 
workers (and whether it was the median or a randomly chosen proposal) and about the income 
of all workers in his or her group. Individual proposals of other workers were never revealed. 
Upon completion of the main part of the experiment participants received instructions 
for the second part that were again read aloud. Remaining questions were only allowed to be 
asked privately, and also answered privately. The second part was a social preference 
elicitation task providing an independent test for social preferences taken from Kerschbamer 
(2013; see the appendix). This was closest in design to the individual allocation task, and 
more distant in design, as q increases from 0, to the other treatments with median voting. 
Notice however that under sincere voting, if q approaches 1, the task becomes akin to an 
individual allocation task again. In this second part of the experiment, subjects are randomly 
matched with another participant in each of ten binary decisions that allocate a certain payoff 
to oneself and to the matched participant. One of the ten allocation decisions is paid out for 
real to the decision maker and the matched participant, where the payoff-relevant allocation 
decision is randomly determined at the end of the experiment. The ten decisions allow 
identifying different distributional preferences non-parametrically. Details on the procedure 
are provided in the appendix. 
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After this, additional individual tasks followed in the third and final part of the 
experiment: specifically, incentivized measurements of individual risk and ambiguity 
preferences using a standard choice list procedure (Holt and Laury, 2002; Engle-Warnick and 
Laszlo, 2006; see online appendix for details), two psychological inventories (Stöber’s, 2001, 
social desirability scale and Cacioppo et al.’s, 1984, need for cognition test),7 and a couple of 
questions regarding socio-demographics and individual background.8 The final stage of the 
experiment included feedback on the randomly selected payoff-relevant decisions in parts 1, 2 
and 3 of the experiment as well as on consequent individual earnings. Payments to subjects 
were made privately and in cash.  
 
 
3. Results 
3.1. Overview of choices 
We start by giving an overview of the average chosen wage levels in the ten treatments. 
Remember that the wage can be determined by the median vote of the eligible workers or by a 
randomly chosen individual worker. Thus, it makes sense to distinguish between a total 
average (TOT) and an average including only those cases in which the median was decisive 
(MED) and not an according-to-probability-q randomly selected group member. Only for 
MED, the median voter prediction based on selfish decision makers holds. For TOT-
predictions based on selfish decision makers one has to take the probabilities that a single 
member can be decisive into account. Table 3 provides the results. 
One can see that the actual figures in Table 3 are close to the predictions based on the 
assumption of rational and selfish decision makers (see the numbers in parentheses in the 
eight cells). Obviously, it is more informative to look at averages contingent on types, and we 
thus refrain from running non-parametric tests on the differences in Table 3. We provide 
averages, contingent on types, in Table 4. 
                                                 
7 The first is a control for experimenter demand (Zizzo, 2010); the second is a control for intellectual 
curiosity. 
8 As we did not get interesting results using these variables (apart possibly from a small effect of higher 
generosity by women subjects), they are not referred to further in this paper. 
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There are several ways to slice the data in Table 4. We start by comparing wage 
proposals in the insider-outsider treatments (three voters) with proposals in the all-workers 
treatments (five voters), contingent on the type of worker. There is no significant difference 
between the two treatments for types 1, types 2, and types 3 (Mann-Whitney-U-tests on the 
individual level (average over the ten periods); p > 0.29 in all cases; q-regimes are collapsed, 
i.e. N = 112).9 Hence, one can conclude that there does not seem to be a significant treatment 
effect in support of union models that take employment into account. In other words, insiders 
do not seem to lower their wage proposals in order to increase employment compared to the 
all-workers case. This is in line with our first prediction. 
Obviously, a deviation from the selfish prediction in q = 0.8 and q = 0.2 makes only 
sense if one deviates to a wage level that ensures employment for at least one other worker. 
This is especially important for type-2 workers in the insider-outsider treatments (potentially 
going from a wage of 50 to a wage of 33 or lower) and for type-3 workers in the all-workers 
treatments (potentially going from a wage of 33 to a wage of 25 or lower) with q = 0.8.10 
An alternative way of slicing the data is provided by comparing across the five q-
regimes, holding the number of voters (three or five) constant, contingent on worker types. 
The hypothesis would be that there is a significant decline of wage proposals with q’s close to 
0 and, perhaps also, close to 1, and from ex ante to ex post for types 1 to 3. Although we will 
have a closer look at the influence of q on wage proposals in the subsequent section, a first 
impression is given by two-sided Kruskal-Wallis tests. Interestingly, most tests are not 
significant. The only two comparisons that are (close to) significantly different across the five 
q-regimes are for types 3 in all-workers treatments (p = 0.02) and types 4 in all-workers 
treatments (p = 0.09). For both types, wages are highest in the intermediate q-range (in line 
with other-regarding preferences extended to uncertainty or with a relatively high λ). 
However, it is much easier to control for several determinants of wage proposals in a 
parametric regression analysis, following in the next section. In the regression, we shall also 
control for the development over the ten periods. Furthermore, the regression allows 
                                                 
9 All p-values reported in this paper are based on two-sided hypothesis tests. 
10 An online appendix shows the distribution of wage proposals, split up according to treatments and 
types. 
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controlling for individual measures of other-regarding preferences and uncertainty 
preferences. 
 
3.2. Econometric analysis  
We continue with a regression analysis of our data. Table 5 contains a multiple level random 
effects censored regression model on the wage proposal. It simultaneously controls for the 
non-independence of observations at the level of subjects (since each subject makes ten 
choices) and at the level of the group (since a common history is established in each group 
after the first period), as well as for the wage proposal being between 0 and 100. Type 1, Type 
2, Type 3 and Type 4 are dummy variables for workers of the respective type (e.g., Type 1 = 1 
with a type-1 worker, else 0). Median chance is our q-varying accountability effect variable. It 
is equal to 1 with the treatments with a 100% chance that the voting outcome becomes 
implemented, 0.8 with the treatments with a 80% chance that the voting outcome becomes 
implemented, 0.2 with the treatments with a 20% chance that the voting outcome becomes 
implemented and 0 when there is no voting outcome. Ex ante is a dummy variable set equal to 
0 with the treatments where one worker is always chosen ex post as a dictatorial wage setter 
and equal to 1 with the treatments where one worker is chosen ex ante to be the dictatorial 
wage setter. INS is the treatment dummy for whether everyone is an insider to the trade union 
(= 1) or whether only three workers are (= 0). Incentivized enables us to control for whether a 
decision is incentivized, as most are, or not; specifically, it is a dummy equal to 1 if a decision 
is incentivized. Period captures the period, between 1 and 10, and hence within-experiment 
experience. Prior experience (= 1 for subjects with experience in previous, albeit unrelated, 
experiments) is a dummy capturing between-experiments as opposed to within-experiment 
experience. Inequality averse and altruistic are dummies for whether a subject has been 
respectively classified as inequality averse or altruistic using our independent social 
preference elicitation task (see the appendix), a standard incentivized measurement of social 
preferences following Kerschbamer (2013). 
Finally, we include some interaction variables involving the type dummies with (a) 
Median chance, to enable us to verify the sensitivity of type dummies effects to changes in q 
and with Ex ante to identify how close the decision environment is to that of a unionized labor 
market, or (b) Inequality averse, as behavior of subjects classified as inequality averse by the 
14 
 
preference elicitation task may change depending on where they stand in terms of social 
preferences, or (c) Altruistic, for similar reasons in relation to subjects classified as altruists. 
One of the results from the descriptive analysis of Section 3.1 is that, in line with the 
first empirical prediction of our model, full or partial union membership do not affect wage 
proposals for the worker types that make proposals in both cases (types 1, 2 and 3); this 
remains the case in the regression analysis (p = 0.183). Another result from the descriptive 
analysis is that wage proposals are sensitive to the worker type. Table 5 corroborates this 
finding, with the highest wage proposals observed for type-1 workers (p < 0.001), followed at 
a distance by type 2 (p < 0.001), followed by type 3 (p < 0.001), followed by type 4 (p < 0.05) 
and type-5 workers. These observations are in line with the second empirical prediction of our 
model, even though of course they are not surprising. 
Table 5 shows a significant effect for Type 1 × Ex ante (p = 0.002).11 Put differently, 
type-1 workers make lower wage proposals, i.e. behave more kindly, only when they know ex 
ante that their wage proposal will be the one that gets implemented. This is consistent with an 
accountability effect as discussed in the introduction and, thus, inconsistent with the fourth 
prediction of our model that do not incorporate accountability directly. 
 
Result 1. Having a full rather than partial trade union membership has no effect 
on the wage proposals. This is in line with our first prediction. 
 
Result 2. Wage proposals are differentiated by worker type and in the direction 
predicted by our model. This fits our second prediction. 
 
Result 3. Type-1 workers behave less kindly when they do not know whether they 
will affect the actual wage. This is consistent with an accountability effect and 
thus inconsistent with the fourth prediction of our model. 
 
The coefficients on Inequality averse and Altruistic need to be interpreted in 
combination with those on the interaction terms. The net effect of inequality aversion on type-
                                                 
11 Note that, while the coefficient on Ex Ante is positive (if statistically insignificant), the one on Type 1 x 
Ex Ante more than offsets it by over 2 to 1. 
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1 workers is to make them propose lower wages, though the marginal effect is way lower than 
the large push up in high wage proposals due to the strategic incentive to do so. Put it 
differently, inequality averse type-1 workers still make higher wage proposals by 
approximately 59 points.12 There is no net effect of inequality aversion in the direction of the 
third prediction for the other types. The net effect of altruism on type-1 workers is 
considerably smaller than that of inequality aversion; altruistic type 1 workers make higher 
wage proposals by approximately 71 points. 
 
Result 4. Being classified as inequality averse or altruistic in the preference 
elicitation task predicts comparatively kind behavior for type-1 workers (only), 
which is consistent with the third prediction of our model for this type (only). 
Being classified as inequality averse leads to comparatively kinder behavior by 
type-1 workers than being classified as altruist. 
 
Unsurprisingly, incentivized choices lead to higher (that is, less kind) wage proposals (p 
< 0.001 in Table 5). 
 
 
4. Discussion and conclusion 
We implemented a very stylized wage setting based on union members voting on their 
preferred wages and, consequently, implementing a certain employment level. Workers are 
heterogeneous in terms of their productivity, and there is thus a conflict among selfish 
workers with regard to the optimal wage. In line with our theoretical prediction, there is no 
difference in wage proposals between a setting in which all five workers vote on the wage 
level and a setting in which only the three most productive workers are allowed to vote. The 
more the voting system is transformed from a median voter scheme to an individual allocation 
task, the more employment levels should be taken into account by workers if there is a feeling 
of accountability or responsibility of workers. However, such an effect is only observed with 
ex ante dictatorship for type-1 players. Overall, the level of pro-social preferences we found is 
                                                 
12 This is found combining the coefficients on Type 1, Inequality averse and Type 1 x Inequality averse. 
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small; however, independent measures of pro-social preferences are still a good predictor for 
wage proposals of at least some (that is, the type-1) workers. While the average wage levels 
under q = 1 indicate a slight shift towards more other-regarding behavior compared to q = 0.8 
and q = 0.2, such an effect is not systematically present in the regression results, and we do 
not want to over-interpret any findings along those lines.13 
Our setup incorporates an allocation decision into a labor market setting and 
disentangles the effects from the individual allocation task and the median voter decision by 
union members. Both the union frame and the gradual transformation from a median voter 
scheme to a dictator scheme are unique in the behavioral economics literature. They allow for 
several potential extensions beyond this paper. Naturally, one has to exercise caution when 
generalizing the results from the experiment to real wage setting environments. It was not the 
aim of this experiment to capture the peculiarities of natural institutions and the behavior of 
unions. For instance, there is variation of responsibility of union leadership and such variation 
parallels, at least to a certain extent, our treatment variation. However, we cannot capture any 
kind of strategic bargaining aspects that underlie the relationship between ordinary union 
members and union leadership. Hence, we want to be very cautious in our claims. 
Nonetheless, there are a couple of findings from the experiment that provide implications for 
the real world. First, voting systems in allocation tasks seem to have the tendency to reduce 
accountability and, thus, lead to more selfish outcomes than systems in which single decision 
makers, though still anonymous, can be held accountable. Second, the size of the union does 
not seem to play a large role in the allocative function through wage setting beyond the 
mechanic effect of the median voter scheme. Of course, it is possible that the size of the union 
is important in another dimension, namely in determining the power of a union, which we 
neglected here. 
We complement results from the empirical literature based on data from the field. The 
literature has, for instance, looked at wage compression effects of union membership (Card et 
al., 2004; Dustmann and Schönberg, 2009). The advantages of experiments are causal 
inference on the treatment variables and the possibility of pinning down the exact mechanisms 
for any effects. Extending our setup is, thus, important to establish generalizability. Several 
                                                 
13 Adding a q=1-related set of dummy variables in the regressions does not change our conclusion. Hence, 
the exact specification does not seem to be an explanation. 
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dimensions seem worthwhile investigating. One could think of varying the parameters of our 
setup, especially the distribution and the exact choice of productivity levels of workers. One 
could also introduce uncertainties over certain aspects of the interaction. Further, it seems 
interesting to analyze different forms of interaction among union members beyond the 
stylized voting game used in the current experiment, which would make membership 
potentially more salient. Obviously, changing union size could be an aspect worthwhile 
exploring. 
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Figure 1: Graphical treatments overview 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Wages and employment 
Wage level (in experimental points) These worker types are employed 
1 – 20 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
21 – 25 1, 2, 3, 4 
26 – 33 1, 2, 3 
34 – 50 1, 2 
51 – 100 1 
 
 
Table 2: Treatment overview 
 q = 1 q = 0.8 q = 0.2 q = 0 (EX-POST) q = 0 (EX-ANTE) 
Five voters INS-1 
n = 40 
INS-0.8 
n = 60 
INS-0.2 
n = 60 
INS-0 
(EX-POST) 
n = 60 
INS-0 
(EX-ANTE) 
n = 60 
Three voters INSOUT-1 
n = 40 
INSOUT-0.8 
n = 60 
INSOUT-0.2 
n = 60 
INSOUT-0 
(EX-POST) 
n = 40 
INSOUT-0 
(EX-ANTE) 
n = 40 
Note: n denotes the number of participants in the respective treatment 
 
Table 3: Average chosen wage levels (selfish prediction in parentheses) 
 q = 1 q = 0.8 q = 0.2 q = 0 
(EX-POST) 
q = 0 
(EX-ANTE) 
Five 
voters 
MED: 41.26 
TOT: 41.26 
(w = 33 for MED) 
MED: 30.73 
TOT: 33.43 
(w = 33 for MED) 
MED: 34.52 
TOT: 45.43 
(w = 33 for MED) 
MED: not appl. 
TOT: 41.62 
(w = 45.6 for TOT) 
MED: not appl. 
TOT: 45.58 
(w = 45.6 for TOT)
Three 
voters 
MED: 30.92 
TOT: 30.92 
(w = 50 for MED) 
MED: 45.87 
TOT: 50.82 
(w = 50 for MED) 
MED: 46.00 
TOT: 64.68 
(w = 50 for MED) 
MED: not appl. 
TOT: 56.26 
(w = 61 for TOT) 
MED: not appl. 
TOT: 60.64 
(w = 61 for TOT) 
MED refers to periods in which the median was decisive; TOT refers to the total average, including all periods. 
q = 0 (EX-ANTE) only includes incentivized choices. 
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Table 4: Average wage proposal by relevant types (selfish predictions in parentheses) 
 q = 1 q = 0.8 q = 0.2 q = 0 (EX-POST) q = 0 (EX-ANTE)
Five voters T1: 77.48 (100) 
T2: 49 (50) 
T3: 27.32 (33) 
T4: 21.03 (25) 
T5: 31.48 (20) 
T1: 88.71 (100) 
T2: 50.25 (50) 
T3: 34.03 (33) 
T4: 20.13 (25) 
T5: 19.23 (20) 
T1: 79.79 (100) 
T2: 43.84 (50) 
T3: 38.05 (33) 
T4: 28.04 (25) 
T5: 24.68 (20) 
T1: 79.04 (100) 
T2: 47.83 (50) 
T3: 31.68 (33) 
T4: 24.91 (25) 
T5: 18.90 (20) 
T1: 80.79 (100) 
T2: 44.40 (50) 
T3: 31.72 (33) 
T4: 24.32 (25) 
T5: 20.25 (20) 
Three voters T1: 83.35 (100) 
T2: 39.93 (50) 
T3: 31.68 (33) 
T1: 87.10 (100) 
T2: 46.00 (50) 
T3: 32.31 (33) 
T1: 89.64 (100) 
T2: 46.45 (50) 
T3: 30.42 (33) 
T1: 72.16 (100) 
T2: 46.35 (50) 
T3: 30.59 (33) 
T1: 80.29 (100) 
T2: 42.86 (50) 
T3: 28.26 (33) 
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Table 5: Multi level Tobit regression on wage proposals 
 β Se 
Type 1 75.710*** (4.542) 
Type 2 33.437*** (4.188) 
Type 3 18.832*** (4.259) 
Type 4 9.335* (4.563) 
Median Chance 0.008 (0.044) 
Ex Ante 7.606 (5.138) 
INS 2.157 (1.621) 
Prior experience 12.466*** (2.748) 
Incentivized 5.369*** (1.125) 
Inequality averse 12.108** (4.371) 
Altruistic 11.026** (3.748) 
Type 1 x median chance 0.004 (0.058) 
Type 2 x median chance -0.121* (0.052) 
Type 3 x median chance -0.030 (0.053) 
Type 4 x median chance -0.036 (0.055) 
Type 1 x ex ante -19.479** (6.236) 
Type 2 x ex ante -7.630 (6.137) 
Type 3 x ex ante -4.978 (6.153) 
Type 4 x ex ante -2.718 (6.818) 
Type 1 x inequality averse -29.190*** (5.454) 
Type 2 x inequality averse -12.171* (5.160) 
Type 3 x inequality averse -13.528* (5.235) 
Type 4 x inequality averse -9.681 (5.438) 
Type 1 x altruistic -15.899** (5.338) 
Type 2 x altruistic -13.541** (4.737) 
Type 3 x altruistic -14.160** (4.905) 
Type 4 x altruistic -8.550 (5.079) 
Period 0.138* (0.066) 
Constant -4.068 (4.731) 
Notes:  n = 4300. The nested random effect regression simultaneously controls for both group level 
and subject level non-independence of observations, and for the censoring of the dependent 
variable (min value: 0; max value: 100). The regression was estimated using Stata/MP 14.0, with 
numbers rounded to 3 decimal places. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 
 
  
26 
 
Appendix A: Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2  
 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
Suppose 0≤λ<1. To prove that the strategy profile (w1,w2,w3)=(Q1,Q2,Q3) is a unique Nash 
equilibrium, we show that setting wi=Qi is a strictly dominant strategy for worker i.  
Suppose first worker 1 is decisive (i.e., worker 1’s wage has been randomly chosen). 
Then w1=Q1 is optimal if 100 >  max{50(2) , (100/3)(3) , 25(4) ,20(5) }    . This holds when 
<1. Similarly, when worker 2 is decisive, w2=Q2 is optimal when 
})5(20,)4(25,)3)(3/100max{()2(50   . This again holds when <1. Finally, when worker 
3 is decisive, w3=Q3 is optimal when })5(20,)4(25max{)3)(3/100(   . Once more, this is 
satisfied when <1. 
We next show that under the median rule worker i receives a payoff from wi=Qi that is 
at least as high as, or strictly higher than, the payoff from any other choice of wi, in any 
strategy profile. This follows from the fact that, whatever the other workers’ choices, worker i 
moves the median wage closest to her optimal value, which, when 0≤<1, is Qi, by setting 
wi=Qi (other values of wi may be equally optimal, but wi=Qi is always among the set of 
optimal choices). To be more precise, suppose the two other workers set their wages below or 
equal to Qi. Then any wage wi equal to or above the largest of these wages is optimal. Second, 
suppose one of the other workers sets his wage below Qi and the other worker sets his wage 
above or equal to Qi. Then a unique best reply is wi=Qi. Finally, suppose each of the two 
other workers set their wage equal to or above Qi. Then any wage wi is optimal. It follows 
that under the median rule wi=Qi is a best reply, regardless of the wage choices of the two 
other workers. Combining this with the analysis for when the worker is decisive shows that 
setting wi=Qi is a strictly dominant strategy, and hence the profile (w1,w2,w3)=(Q1,Q2,Q3) is 
the unique Nash equilibrium. 
Suppose now =1. When worker i is decisive, each of the wages {Qi,…,Q5} is a best 
reply. This implies that any profile (w1,w2,w3) such that wi{Qi,…,Q5} is a Nash equilibrium, 
because when worker i is decisive any wage wi{Qi,…,Q5} is optimal. Under the median 
rule, any wage wi{Qi,…,Q5} is once more optimal. To see this, suppose first that each of the 
two workers has chosen a wage below or equal to Qi. In this case any wage wi{Q1,…,Q5} is 
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optimal for worker i. Suppose then one worker has chosen a wage below Qi, and the other has 
chosen a wage above or equal to Qi. Then any wage wi{Qi,…,Q5}is optimal. Finally, 
suppose both other workers choose a wage equal to or above Qi. Then, any wage 
wi{Q1,…,Q5} is optimal for worker i. This implies that no matter what the other workers 
decide, any wage wi{Qi,…,Q5} is optimal under the median rule. Any profile (w1,w2,w3) 
such that wi{Qi,…,Q5} is therefore a Nash equilibrium.  
Suppose now that >1. We show that setting wi=Q5 is a strictly dominant strategy for 
each worker. When decisive, w1=Q5 is optimal for worker 1 when 
})4(25,)3)(3/100(,)2(50,100max{)5(20   . This holds when >1. When worker 2 is 
decisive, w2=Q5 is optimal if })4(25,)3)(3/100(,)2(50max{)5(20   , and this again holds 
when >1. Finally, consider worker 3. When he is decisive, w3=Q5 is optimal when 
})4(25,)3)(3/100max{()5(20   , and this again holds when >1. 
Under the median rule, when >1, worker i’s best outcome is that the median wage is Q5. 
Thus, irrespective of the other workers’ wage choices, worker i will want to bring the median 
as close to Q5 as possible; setting wi=Q5 is always the, potentially non-unique, wage that 
accomplishes this objective. This shows that setting wi=Q5 is a strictly dominant strategy for 
each worker i when >1. This, in turn implies that the Nash equilibrium (w1,w2,w3)=(Q5, Q5, 
Q5) is unique when >1. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
Suppose <1. The proof that the strategy profile (w1,w2,w3,w4,w5)=(Q1,Q2,Q3,Q4,Q5) is a 
unique Nash equilibrium is a straightforward generalization of the proof of Proposition 1.  
Similarly, when =1, the proof that there are multiple equilibria again follows from a 
generalization of the proof for the corresponding part of Proposition 1. Finally, suppose >1. 
The proof that (w1,w2,w3,w4,w5)=(Q5,Q5,Q5,Q5,Q5) is the unique equilibrium is once more a 
straightforward generalization of the three-worker analysis from Proposition 1. 
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Appendix B: Social preference elicitation task (based on 
Kerschbamer, 2015) 
 
Disadvantageous Inequality Block 
LEFT Your Choice 
(please mark) 
RIGHT 
you 
get 
passive 
agent gets 
 you  
get 
passive agent 
gets 
 
15 Points 
 
30 Points 
 
 
LEFT                  RIGHT 
 
20 Points 
 
20 Points 
 
19 Points 
 
30 Points 
 
 
LEFT                      RIGHT 
 
20 Points 
 
20 Points 
 
20 Points 
 
30 Points 
 
 
LEFT                      RIGHT 
 
20 Points 
 
20 Points 
 
21 Points 
 
30 Points 
 
 
LEFT                      RIGHT 
 
20 Points 
 
20 Points 
 
25 Points 
 
30 Points 
 
 
LEFT                      RIGHT 
 
20 Points 
 
20 Points 
 
Advantageous Inequality Block 
LEFT Your Choice 
(please mark)
RIGHT 
you 
get 
passive 
agent gets 
 You 
get 
passive agent 
gets 
 
15 Points 
 
10 Points 
 
 
LEFT                  RIGHT 
 
20 Points 
 
20 Points 
 
19 Points 
 
10 Points 
 
 
LEFT                     RIGHT 
 
20 Points 
 
20 Points 
 
20 Points 
 
10 Points 
 
 
LEFT                     RIGHT 
 
20 Points 
 
20 Points 
 
21 Points 
 
10 Points 
 
 
LEFT                     RIGHT 
 
20 Points 
 
20 Points 
 
25 Points 
 
10 Points 
 
 
LEFT                     RIGHT 
 
20 Points 
 
20 Points 
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Translation of Choices in the Distributional-Preferences Elicitation Task 
into WTP  
 
Disadvantageous Inequality Block (DIP) 
 
in the DIB subject 
chooses LEFT for the 
first time in row 
WTPd proxy for WTP
d  
used 
1 +0.5 ≤   WTPd  +0.5 
2 +0.1 ≤   WTPd  < +0.5 +0.3 
3 +0.0 ≤   WTPd  < +0.1 +0.05 
4 -0.1 ≤   WTPd  < -0.0 -0.05 
5 -0.5 ≤   WTPd  < -0.1 -0.3 
never      WTPd  < -0.5 -0.5 
 
Advantageous Inequality Block (AIB) 
 
in the AIB subject 
chooses LEFT for the 
first time in row 
WTPa proxy for WTP
a  
used 
1      WTPa  ≤ -0.5 -0.5 
2 -0.5 <  WTPa  ≤ -0.1 -0.3 
3 -0.1 <  WTPa  ≤ -0.0 -0.05 
4 +0.0 <  WTPa  ≤ +0.1 +0.05 
5 +0.1 <  WTPa  ≤ 0.5 +0.3 
never +0.5 <  WTPa    +0.5 
 
 
WTPd for WPTd > 0: |WTPd| = amount of own material payoff the decision maker is 
willing to give up in the domain of disadvantageous inequality in order to 
increase the other's material payoff by one unit; 
 
for WPTd< 0: |WTPd| = amount of own material payoff the decision maker is 
willing to give up in the domain of disadvantageous inequality in order to 
decrease the other's material payoff by one unit (in this interpretation 
inequalities need to be reversed; for instance, subjects who never switch on the 
X-list reveal that they are willing to give up at least 50 Cents of their own 
income to decrease the income of the other player by 1 Euro); 
 
WTPa defined similarly for the domain of advantageous inequality. 
 
